The macro-structure of the master plan was a grid of roads at roughly 1000m spacing, with land uses widely distributed in a coarse zoning plan across the entire designated area. This plan purported to be 'deduced' from a series of abstract policy 'goals' put to the Board and approved at the outset -an approach regarded at the time as quite an advanced way of working 3 . The grid structure was designed ...
• to be easily comprehensible and navigable,
• to permit unconstrained use of the motor car,
• to avoid the inefficiencies and costs of tidal flows between home and work which arise where jobs are in a single work area,
• to offer residents a choice between private and public transport,
• by mixing homes with workplaces, shopping, educational and other services, to create at least the potentiality for people to make short trips, and to have a choice of service centres to use, and
• to contribute to pedestrian safety by ensuring that all roads were either clearly for car priority (the grid) or for pedestrian priority (the local roads).
This was based on research showing that pedestrians were most at risk on intermediate kinds of roads -then known as 'local distributor roads' -which were therefore to be avoided (Levin and Bruce, 1968) .
2 Richard Llewelyn Davies died in 1981; Walter Bor in 1999 while I was writing this and before I could send a copy for his comments. 3 These goals were (i) opportunity and freedom of choice (ii) easy movement and access and good communications (iii) balance and variety (iv) an attractive city (v) public awareness and participation and (vi) efficient and imaginative use of resources. The allegedly deductive approach as part of rational comprehensive planning was criticised at the time as a sham (Gutch, 1970) . proposal from Nathaniel Lichfield and myself for a systematic cost benefit study comparing the two approaches met a frosty response within the team and was probably never put to the Board. But this is a digression.
The other tension in the master planning was about shopping. Whereas the logic of the plan was to distribute all services widely over the urban area, every version of the master plan showed one dominant centre. Though very much aware of the tendency of retailing to over-concentrate, we considered that a strong set of comparison goods retailers could only be attracted to the town if they and their customers had the benefit of this agglomeration. The
Board members considered 'a centre' as essential to the image and identity of the town. So in it went, without controversy but with a number of problems in its wake, as we shall see.
A distinctive approach to how the city would grow on its grid was a part of the planning from the outset. (i) The grid of main roads would have speed limits of 30mph (50 km/h), traffic light control at main cross-roads and synchronisation to permit most cohorts of traffic to flow through successive lights on green.
(ii) With these vehicle speeds, it would be safe and feasible to have sideturnings every few hundred metres -3, 4 or even 5 turnings in the typical 1000m stretch between cross-roads-and traffic flows on each turning would be reduced to safe levels.
(iii) Drivers would thus be able to pull off the road for shopping, school and other business.
(iv) Buses could safely stop beside the main roads, both at cross-roads (for interchange) and at intermediate points where they would typically connect with footpath systems.
(v) Densities of development, for housing and other activities, would be highest along these grid roads, especially between the cross-roads, and would fall off to the lowest densities in the centre of each grid square where buildings with big gardens, allotments, playing fields and parks would mostly be found.
(vi) The positions on main roads, mid-way between the cross-roads, would be the nodes for services with various combinations of schools, shops, libraries, clinics, workplaces and so on.
(vii) This strategy seemed a robust way of trying to sustain good local shopping in the face of the concentration and centralisation trends evident in modern retailing. It was explicitly envisaged that shops could draw on passing trade as well as on local pedestrians and that, where a local convenience store folded, the premises could attract other viable retail or non-retail use.
(This was a conscious rejection of the practice common in earlier new town 6 The contemporary version, with strong input from Mike Macrae, is in the master plan (MKDC 1970, Vol1 and Llewelyn-Davies et al 1970, Vol2 ) .
and local planning of clumping development in distinct 'neighbourhoods' and planning a 'centre' tucked away within each.) (viii) Residents would thus be able to choose between at least 4 such service centres within 1000m and between a much larger number using cycle, car or bus.
(ix) Traffic noise on such a grid road system would be modest, so adjoining buildings would enjoy reasonable peace and quiet. Only at main cross-roads would noise levels justify any separation of buildings from the grid.
Moving through Milton Keynes would thus be an experience very similar to moving though a typical European town, built with little formal planning over the last centuries: commerce and services on main roads, housing and employment clustered around the most accessible points and lines, density falling away behind. Your nearest service cluster is close. If you want a different food shop, a different school or a squash court you may need to carry on to the next one. Although the macro-grid does not lend itself very well to public transport, the combined effect of these local design principles did as much as could be done in that context to make the bus network direct (by staying on the main roads) and well patronised (through the bunching of densities along the routes). The wide range of local building densities from multi-storey flats and offices through to very low densities around golf courses, lakes and allotments had both an aesthetic and a social intent: it was part of a strong rejection of the notorious uniformity of 2-storey houses in earlier new towns and part of a strategy to attract not just the newly-forming households of skilled workers but a more diverse range of age groups, social class and ethnicity. This was an attempt to engineer a way round a another perceived failing of earlier new towns.
These development principles and intentions were embedded in the master plan handed over to the Development Corporation, and its new professional staff, in 1970.
A number of major changes were soon made to the plan, and others took effect during the implementation process.
The most important changes flowed from the Corporation's immediate rethinking of the road system. They decided to re-design the main grid to operate without an urban speed limit -thus at speeds of 60-70 mph (95-110 km/h). This brought many design changes:
(a) Traffic lights were replaced with roundabouts, British style, at most crossroads, and usually with a slight rotation so each road would kink slightly on entering and leaving.
In each of these pairs of caricatures the original intention is on the left, the outcome as built on the right.
(b) Very few side turnings could safely be permitted: only 1 or at the most 2 in a 1000m stretch.
(c) Neither cars nor buses could safely be allowed to pull to the side of the main roads and stop: instead they would have to leave by slip roads and stop within the grid-squares. Bus routes thus became longer and circuitous.
(d) Land reservations for main roads were greatly enlarged to fit the acceleration and deceleration lanes and to separate built-up areas from the-now much noisier-roads.
(e) As a further measure against noise, a great deal of earth mounding and massive planting was added along the grid roads.
The effect of these transport changes was reinforced by a complete change in the parcelling, design and naming of development sites.
(f) The intention had been that the normal unit for design and for development operations would be centred on the main grid road at the mid-point between crossroads:
(g) Local shopping and service centres were pushed away from the grid road frontages, becoming embedded in the edges-or occasionally in the middle-of the development parcels. Retailers could thus no longer expect significant passing trade, and few even enjoyed visibility from the main roads.
(h) The interior of the grid square thus became the typical design unit; most squares had just one design team, one developer, one name (and one post code). The practical and conceptual building block of the city was thus not the bead on the string but the lozenge lying within the high-speed grid of roads. to the bus, often through woodland which can be dripping and rather scary.
Travel is overwhelmingly by car (especially for men) with buses tending to carry women and children. The segregated cycle paths work well, however, and redeem the situation for many people, especially older children and young adults.
How do we attribute responsibility for this very poor outcome-this disaster, in my judgement?
Part of the blame is quite clearly ours for the way we wrote and drew the master plan. It was much less forceful, less clear and less passionate than it could and should have been. Memory tells me that we tried to write more firmly but the text was watered down, on the principle that the plan should be more flexible, less prescriptive. Walter Bor has since told me that it was Richard Llewelyn Davies who finally insisted on this flexible presentation.
The initial planning team-and especially myself-should take responsibility for two failures to anticipate and work around market forces. We should have realised how reluctant Britain's notoriously conservative volume housebuilding firms would be to vary their densities and we should have devised land policies and pricing strategies along with tough design briefs to enforce compliance. Equally, although we foresaw the risks of weak local retailing, we should have created much stronger instruments and tenure arrangements to fight the trend.
A further failing was in the drawing. The key drawing in the master plan is almost ambiguous-certainly not very explicit-about the interdependent design principles listed (at i-ix) above. This aggravated the weakness of the prose.
Some of the responsibility lies with the structural relationship of consultant and client. For one group to prepare a plan and hand it over to another group for implementation is a recipe for trouble (though there may be benefits as well).
The transformation of the road designs and of the land parcelling were part of a process whereby the professionals in MKDC-some newly appointed and none in post more than 2 years-were making the plan their own. As the initial planning team we were consulted about the road changes and we responded very critically indeed, but evidently to no effect. Perhaps there is also scope to 'retro-fit' some of the lost elements. We could try...
• replacing roundabouts with lights,
• straightening out the junctions to improve orientation,
• reducing speeds to 30 mph on the grid,
• re-cycling some of the green areas along the main roads (space which David Pritchard has named SLOAP 8 ) for dense development with lay-bys, service bays, shops and so on.
The combination of tough design briefs, the relatively mature local property market and the slightly more creative outlook of today's private and social developers might make it financially and technically feasible. Much would depend on who now owns the SLOAP since the privatisation of New Town assets.
These are reflections by someone who was involved at the outset but not since then (save as an embarrassed and disoriented visitor). If other
